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 1 
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF VACCINES:  
TAKEAWAYS FROM RECENT INFECTIOUS DISEASE OUTBREAKS 
 
Ana Santos Rutschman* 
 
This Essay examines the ways in which intellectual property regimes influence incentives for the 
development of new vaccines for infectious diseases. Charting the tension between market forces 
and public health imperatives, the Essay considers an emerging solution to the long-standing 
problem of insufficient incentives for vaccine research and development: the rise of public-private 
partnerships in the health space. The Essay provides a short case study on CEPI, a large-scale 
public-private partnership dedicated exclusively to funding research on vaccines for infectious 
diseases. In exploring how the interaction between intellectual property rules and practices affect 
vaccine innovation, the Essay offers illustrations from recent outbreaks of infectious diseases, 
including the 2019 novel coronavirus, Zika, and Ebola. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In late 2019, a new strain of coronavirus, a family of viruses causing serious respiratory 
illnesses, infected several people at a seafood market in Wuhan, a large city in China. The 
pathogen, known as 2019-nCoV, quickly spread across the globe, prompting the World Health 
Organization to declare the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on 
January 30, 2020.1 At this point, the global case count was approaching 10,000, resulting in over 
200 deaths.2 No vaccine is—or will be—available during the duration of the outbreak. Yet, as soon 
as the seriousness of 2019-nCoV infection became apparent, several research institutions, 
pharmaceutical companies, public-private partnerships and governmental actors announced 
funding for, and immediate work on, the development of vaccines targeting 2019-nCoV.3 
This story is not new. While the 2019-2020 coronavirus outbreak presents idiosyncratic 
challenges to local and international public health systems, the absence of fully developed vaccines 
has been a constant in recent transnational, large-scale outbreaks of infectious diseases. It 
happened with Zika in 2015-16 and Ebola in 2014-16. Similarly, globalized outbreaks throughout 
the early 21st century have prompted a race to develop vaccine candidates among multi-party 
research and development (R&D) cohorts. The most recent product of such a race is a landmark 
vaccine, Ervebo, which was approved in December 2019 by the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and is the first commercially available vaccine targeting a virus in the Ebola 
                                                        
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, Center for Health Law Studies; Center for 
International and Comparative Law. S.J.D., LL.M., Duke Law School. 
1 WORLD HEALTH ORG., Statement on the Second Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) 
Emergency Committee Regarding the Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus (2019-Ncov), (Jan. 30, 2020), 
https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-health-
regulations-%282005%29-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-%282019-ncov%29. 
2 U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CONFIRMED 2019-NCOV CASES GLOBALLY, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/locations-confirmed-cases.html#map; WORLDOMETER, WUHAN 
CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK (last accessed Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/ (last accessed 
Jan. 30, 2020). 
3 See e.g. Shawn Radcliffe, How Long Will It Take to Develop a Vaccine for Coronavirus?, HEALTHLINE, 
https://www.healthline.com/health-news/how-long-will-it-take-to-develop-vaccine-for-coronavirus. 
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family.4 Efforts to bring the first Ebola vaccine to market gained momentum in 2015, as the 
deadliest Ebola outbreak on record ravaged West Africa and triggered a wave of international 
concern. In a world in which infectious diseases like Ebola and COVID-2019 are poised to travel 
faster and wider, the approval of Ervebo has been regarded as a victory for public health. 
However, while constituting milestones in public health preparedness, the development—
and eventual approval—of vaccines as a response to infectious disease outbreaks also hides a 
troubled history of R&D, (mis)articulation between the public and private sectors, and 
shortcomings of intellectual property (IP) regimes, all of which expose significant limitations in 
current legal and policy regimes designed to promote innovation. Using examples drawn from the 
current vaccine development landscape, this Essay explores the ways in which law and policy have 
been designed to support the development and commercialization of new vaccines, and how they 
often fail to achieve that goal. In Part I, the Essay focuses on the default regime aimed at spurring 
biopharmaceutical innovation—the patent system—and describes the misalignment between 
patent-based incentives to R&D and the characteristics of markets for vaccines targeting infectious 
diseases like the novel coronavirus, Zika and Ebola. In Part II, the Essay analyzes an emerging 
solution for the current incentives problem in the field of vaccines: the growing role of newly 
created public-private partnerships working directly and solely in the vaccine R&D space. 
 
I. IP THEORY APPLIED TO VACCINES FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
 
A recurring trope in utilitarian IP narratives is that patent regimes are necessary for the 
promotion of socially desirable innovation, particularly in chronically underfunded areas of 
science and technology. According to some strands of these narratives, the need for patents is 
especially pressing in the case of biopharmaceutical innovation, where heightened R&D costs and 
risk of failure may drive would-be investors away if no form of market exclusivity is offered.5 
While this view has been progressively nuanced in literature and practice, part of this ethos remains 
at the core of current embodiments of the patent bargain.  
Even within the biopharmaceutical innovation ecosystem, there is an important subject 
matter differentiation: some forms of technology and certain diseases have traditionally attracted 
more attention and funding streams, while others struggle to capture them, often irrespective of 
their public health toll. Taken as a whole, the field of vaccines is one that tends to disproportionally 
populate the latter group.6 
At first blush, this should not be the case. Vaccines constitute relatively economical means 
of preventing or reducing the burden of disease, disability and death. Moreover, they are widely 
regarded as instrumental in furthering related public health goals, such as the lessening of 
inequality among impoverished populations.7 From both an innovation policy and a public health 
                                                        
4 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FIRST FDA-APPROVED VACCINE FOR THE PREVENTION OF EBOLA VIRUS DISEASE, 
MARKING A CRITICAL MILESTONE IN PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE (DEC. 19, 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/first-fda-approved-vaccine-prevention-ebola-virus-disease-
marking-critical-milestone-public-health. 
5 See e.g. WILLIAM W. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW, HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS (2003), at 316. 
6 See Stanley A. Plotkin et al., Establishing a Global Vaccine-Development Fund, 373 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 297 
(2015) (listing vaccine-preventable diseases for which no vaccines have yet been developed). 
7 See F.E. Andre et al., Vaccination Greatly Reduces Disease, Disability, Death and Inequity Worldwide, BULL. 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., (https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/86/2/07-040089/en/). 
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perspective, vaccines are extremely cost-effective products whose development should attract 
adequate funding and resources. However, the specific properties of vaccines as a form of 
biotechnology, together with the economics of vaccine markets, make them a poor match for 
contemporary, IP-driven innovation regimes. 
As commodified goods, vaccines are often regarded as unappealing investment prospects. 
This is attributable to several factors.8 The goal of vaccine deployment is eminently preventative. 
Success in this field translates into a non-event, or in the lessening of characteristics associated 
with a particular event—an outbreak. As several commentators have pointed out, the quantification 
of the savings generated by the effective deployment of vaccines is hard to perform, if not virtually 
impossible.9 Moreover, these savings—to multiple individual and institutional players across 
health systems—do not translate into direct economic returns for vaccine developers. 
Unlike several other biologic products, which require multiple doses or even life-long use, 
many vaccines deliver long-term immunity through a single use, while many others require a very 
limited number of uses. This feature limits the possibilities of monetization of vaccines in 
significant ways. As commentators have noted, “[t]he longer the efficacy [of a vaccine], the 
smaller the demand.”10 Because contemporary IP is largely animated by the prospect of non-trivial 
economic returns, such a limitation on the size of the market further conditions the investment 
appeal of most vaccines.  
Even within existing markets for vaccines targeting infectious pathogens, the successful 
deployment of vaccines faces practical hurdles. Unlike conventional drugs (although similarly to 
other biologics), preserving the efficacy of a dose of vaccine requires the maintenance of cold 
chain.11 Some types of vaccines—such as live virus vaccines—are particularly sensitive to 
temperature changes, a feature that poses enhanced problems in reaching vaccine markets in 
remote areas of the Global South. While in isolation these characteristics are not enough to lessen 
the profitability of vaccines from the perspective of a would-be investor, they add to the 
distinctiveness of vaccines as biopharmaceutical products and, by extension, to the complexities 
that mire vaccine markets. 
As of lately, in both the South and the North, rates of vaccine confidence have started to 
plummet.12 The phenomenon is especially pronounced across Europe, Central Africa and North 
America, where the percentages of people who agree with the proposition that vaccines are safe 
are far below the percentages generally required to maintain immunity to certain vaccine-
preventable diseases within communities, also known as herd immunity.13 Severe measles 
outbreaks in Washington State in 2019 and in New York State in 2018-19, which set records for 
measles infection in the United States in the twenty-first century, have been linked to a decrease 
                                                        
8 For an expanded analysis of the specifics of vaccines and vaccine markets, see Ana Santos Rutschman, The 
Vaccine Race in the 21st Century, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 729, 751-758 (2019). 
9 See e.g. Rino Rappuoli et al., The Intangible Value of Vaccination, 297 SCI. 937 (2002). 
10 Patricia M. Danzon et al., Vaccine Supply: A Cross-National Perspective, 24 HEALTH AFF. 706, 707 (2005). 
11 Umit Kartoglu & Julie Milstien, Tools and Approaches to Ensure Quality of Vaccines Throughout the Cold 
Chain, 13 EXPERT REV. VACCINES 843 (2014). 
12 Jamie Ducharme, Most People Worldwide Trust That Vaccines Are Safe—But the Number Who Don't Is 
Concerning, TIME MAGAZINE (Jun. 19, 2019), https://time.com/5609984/vaccine-trust-worldwide/. 
13 VACCINE KNOWLEDGE PROJECT, HERD IMMUNITY (HERD PROTECTION), https://vk.ovg.ox.ac.uk/vk/herd-immunity. 
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in herd immunity within the affected localities.14 To date, there is no data suggesting that the rise 
of vaccine mistrust might result in a decline of investment in vaccine R&D. However, a vaccine-
specific property (herd immunity), combined with the recent decline in vaccine confidence, further 
accentuate the idiosyncrasies of vaccines as instruments for the promotion of public health.  
A final element that sets vaccines apart from most other fields of biotechnology is the 
historical evolution and concentration on the supply side of the market. In the mid-1940s there 
were over 50 licensed vaccine manufacturers in the United States; by the late 1990s the number 
had fallen below ten.15 Market exodus appears to have been driven by a mix of liability-related 
concerns—which the 1986 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act sought to address16—and 
economic considerations. These considerations encompassed both rising regulatory costs 
associated with vaccine development and approval,17 as well as the perceived unprofitability of 
vaccines.18 
To put things in perspective, consider how sales of vaccines fare when compared with sales 
of other pharmaceutical products. In the wake of the 2018-19 measles outbreaks, sales of MMR 
vaccines (measles-mumps-rubella) increased by 58% in the United States when compared to the 
previous year, generating a total of $675 million.19 By contrast, Januvia, a drug used in the 
treatment of diabetes, generates close to $6 billion a year.20 The drug is manufactured by Merck, 
which is also the sole manufacturer of MMR vaccines in the United States. Merck’s Keytruda, a 
biologic used in oncology which is projected to become the company’s best-selling drug over the 
next few years, is expected to surpass the yearly mark of $20 billion.21  
In considering the relative unprofitability of vaccines like MMR, it is important to 
underscore that this is one the best-selling vaccines currently on the market. Perhaps the most well-
known example of a commercially successful vaccine is the case of Gardasil, a vaccine also 
manufactured by Merck that targets human papillomavirus (HPV), and which generated over $3 
billion in 2018, an increase by a factor of 3.7 when compared to the average growth registered in 
the preceding three years.22 
                                                        
14 Aimee Cunningham, How Holes in Herd Immunity Led to a 25-year High in U.S. Measles Cases, SCIENCENEWS 
(Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/holes-herd-immunity-led-25-year-high-us-measles-cases. 
15 Rutschman, The Vaccine Race, supra note 8, at 740-41 (presenting data on manufacturer entrance and attrition in 
the United States vaccine market). 
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-21–300aa-23 (1988). 
17 Rutschman, The Vaccine Race, supra note 8, at 743. 
18 See e.g. Jon Cohen, U.S. Vaccine Supply Falls Seriously Short, 295 SCI. 1998 (Mar. 15, 2002). 
19 See Berkely Lovelace Jr., US Measles Outbreak Helps Boost Merck’s Vaccine Sales in Second Quarter, CNBC 
(Jul. 30, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/30/nasty-us-measles-outbreak-helps-boost-merck-vaccine-sales-in-
q2.html. 
20 MERCK, Merck Announces Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 2017 Financial Results (Feb. 2, 2018), 
https://investors.merck.com/news/press-release-details/2018/Merck-Announces-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-
2017-Financial-Results/default.aspx. 
21 Josh Nathan-Kazis, Merck’s Keytruda Will Become Best-Selling Drug Worldwide, Research Group Says, 
BARRON’S (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.barrons.com/articles/mercks-keytruda-will-become-best-selling-drug-
worldwide-research-group-says-51570204530. 
22 Trefis Team, Merck’s $3 Billion Drug Jumped To 4x Growth Over Previous Year, FORBES (Oct. 4, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2019/10/04/mercks-3-billion-drug-jumped-to-4x-growth-over-
previous-year/#4e4113de6294. 
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While the examples of MMR and Gardasil help illustrate the relative scale of revenue 
streams generated by vaccines, it is important to note that these are outliers in the vaccine market 
landscape. As a whole, and largely due to the characteristics surveyed above, the field of vaccines 
is considered unprofitable and unattractive to most players in the biopharmaceutical arena.23 As a 
consequence, vaccine R&D has been significantly underfunded, particularly from the mid-
twentieth century onwards.24 
These limitations are especially salient in the case of vaccines targeting infectious diseases 
that are not traditionally endemic to the Global North. The ongoing development of vaccines 
targeting different strains of Ebola illustrates this difference. Until the 2014-16 outbreak, the only 
existing vaccine candidate was languishing in storage, having failed to attract a private-sector 
sponsor for clinical trials and the later stages of the regulatory approval process.25 Unlike 
immunization against measles, mumps and rubella, which is part of Centers of Disease Control 
and Prevention’s immunization schedules,26 there was no foreseeable market for an Ebola vaccine 
and therefore, from an economic point of view, no incentive for private companies to engage in 
the costliest stages of R&D. A variation of this lack of commercial appeal was observable during 
the first months of the 2019-20 coronavirus outbreak: even though the U.S. National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) quickly initiated R&D on the new coronavirus strain—and in spite of the escalating 
morbidity and mortality toll of the virus—the agency was [at first] unsuccessful in finding a large 
private-sector partner interested in partnering to develop a vaccine candidate.27  
Incentives regimes anchored predominantly in IP thus fail to account for the specificities—
and relatively limited prospects of revenue generation—of vaccines targeting infectious diseases 
that have very limited markets, if any, in the United States or the Global North.28 To be sure, 
vaccines are not the only field of biotechnology that is routinely underfunded and fails to attract 
the attention of major players in the private sector. For instance, diseases affecting very small 
segments of the population, the so-called orphan diseases,29 face a similar predicament. However, 
unlike the drugs or biologics likely needed to address orphan diseases (or non-vaccine preventable 
conditions), most vaccine technology currently in use is relatively simple.30 Moreover, in the case 
                                                        
23 See e.g. A Smarter Jab, The Economist (Oct. 14, 2010), https://www.economist.com/business/2010/10/14/a-
smarter-jab. 
24 Rutschman, The Vaccine Race, supra note 8, 738-744 (surveying the arc of vaccine R&D in the United States 
throughout the twentieth century). 
25 See Denise Grady, Ebola Vaccine, Ready for Test, Sat on the Shelf, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/health/without-lucrative-market-potential-ebola-vaccine-was-shelved-for-
years.html. 
26 U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CHILD AND ADOLESCENT IMMUNIZATION SCHEDULE (2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/schedules/hcp/imz/child-adolescent.html; ID., RECOMMENDED ADULT IMMUNIZATION 
SCHEDULE FOR AGES 19 YEARS OR OLDER (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/schedules/hcp/imz/adult.html. 
27 Note to Editors: information to be updated as close as possible to publication. 
28 Supra note 6. 
29 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ORPHAN PRODUCTS: HOPE FOR PEOPLE WITH RARE DISEASES (2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-information-consumers/orphan-products-hope-people-rare-diseases (defining 
orphan diseases as those affecting fewer than 200,000 in the United States). 
30 The Essay does not focus on more complex forms of vaccine technology currently under development, but not 
commercially available, such as DNA vaccines or vaccines targeting certain types of cancer (excluding HPV). See 
also DPT. HEALTH & HEALTH SERV., VACCINE TYPES, https://www.vaccines.gov/basics/types (listing the four 
existing types of vaccines). 
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of the pathogens at the root of recent infectious disease outbreaks—and likely to originate future 
outbreaks—R&D often takes place on an extremely compressed timeline. For instance, when U.S. 
Army scientists decided to develop a Zika candidate during the early stages of the 2015-16 
outbreak, they adapted existing vaccine technology and produced a vaccine candidate in roughly 
three months.31  
Shorter R&D timelines and reliance on relatively straightforward, well-known processes— 
the killing or weakening of viral matter and combining it with enhancers and stabilizers32—should 
in principle counterbalance the pervasive lack of pre-outbreak incentives to R&D, particularly if a 
public health crisis in the form of an outbreak alters the incentives landscape. Yet, vaccines 
targeting diseases like Zika or coronaviruses offer prospective investors truncated markets on 
multiple levels: quantitative (overall number of patients indicated to receive a vaccine); 
geographical (incidence of outbreaks in “hubs” across the globe, as opposed to the near-global 
demand for blockbuster drugs dealing with cardiovascular or oncology diseases); and temporal 
(relative shortness of outbreaks, following which demand for vaccines declines). Against this 
backdrop, even a spike in funding generated by an outbreak is likely to be ephemeral. 
Until recently, there were very few vaccine-specific responses to the problems posed by 
the misalignment between IP incentives frameworks and actual investment in vaccine R&D. At 
the conceptual level, scholars of incentives theory have long recommended the pairing of IP with 
non-IP incentives such as prizes, grants, tax credits or reimbursement schemes as a general 
prescription33 for innovation policy across different technology domains. Scholars focused on the 
specific impact of IP regimes on vaccine R&D have directed their attention to themes adjacent to, 
but not centered on, the problem of incentives.34 In practice, an important change occurred in the 
early 2000s, as several non-profit organizations began forming around selected underfunded 
diseases, to support disease-specific R&D on a range of drugs or treatments (although not 
specifically vaccines): for example, this was the case of the Drugs for Neglected Diseases 
Initiative, which focused many of its early efforts on malaria R&D.35 The recent wave of 
international outbreaks of infectious diseases, however, has underscored the need for solutions 
tailored to the idiosyncrasies of vaccine markets.  
The Essay now turns to the current embodiment of the first large-scale, vaccine-specific 
response to the problem outlined above—a response that is aimed directly at counterbalancing the 
structural limitations of IP-based incentives regimes, and which was prompted by the shortcomings 
in funding for vaccine R&D observed before and during the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak. It presents a 
short case study on the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), a public-private 
partnership focused on selecting and funding vaccine R&D projects in an effort to prevent 
                                                        
31 Annette M. Boyle, Army Research Produces Zika Vaccine Candidate in Record Time, U.S. MED. (Aug. 2016), 
https://www.usmedicine.com/agencies/department-of-defense-dod/army-research-produces-zika-vaccine-candidate-
in-record-time/. 
32 DPT. HEALTH & HEALTH SERV., VACCINE TYPES, https://www.vaccines.gov/basics/types (listing the four existing 
types of vaccines). 
33 See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128 YALE. L. J. 544 
(2019). 
34 See Amy Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual Property Law: Open Science in Influenza, 102 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1539 (2017) (addressing instances of vaccine innovation outside IP frameworks); Ana Santos Rutschman, IP 
Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 1200 (2018) (focusing on solutions for transactional 
problems arising during licensure of IP-protected vaccine technology). 
35 DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE, https://www.dndi.org. 
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outbreaks of infectious diseases.36 Importantly, in January 2020 CEPI entered into agreements to 
provide financial support for the development of three different types of vaccines for the Wuhan 
coronavirus.37 The financial commitment came less than two weeks after Chinese scientists first 
made a sequence of COVID-19 available through a public database.38  
In addition to providing an overview of CEPI—and an insight into how public-private 
partnerships can play a role in progressively detaching vaccine R&D from IP incentives molds—
the next section highlights how collaborative R&D models can co-exist with IP rights associated 
with the development of new vaccines and vaccine technology.  
 
II. SOLVING THE INCENTIVES PUZZLE FOR VACCINES: THE RISE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
 
A. Global Health Public-Private Partnerships in Context 
 
Until the 1990s, there were barely any public-private partnerships operating in the drug 
development space.39 The landscape changed dramatically in the early 2000s, with heterogeneous 
institutions entering into increasingly larger collaborative agreements.40 In the biopharmaceutical 
arena, these partnerships tend to assume one of two models: access partnerships and product 
development partnerships.41  
Access partnerships operate mainly by pulling together resources to guarantee the purchase 
and subsequent distribution of biopharmaceuticals.42 The focus of these partnerships is to bring 
“existing drugs to underserved markets.”43 The most prominent example in the field of vaccines is 
Gavi, a non-profit, international public-private partnership created in 2000 to “improve access to 
new and underused vaccines” in the Global South.44 Gavi is supported by a broad network of 
funders, including the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, governments, international organizations 
like the World Health Organization, UNICEF and the World Bank, the biopharmaceutical industry, 
civil society organizations, and research and technical health institutes.45 Gavi relies on long-term 
                                                        
36 COALITION FOR EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS INNOVATIONS (hereinafter CEPI), CEPI MISSION, 
http://cepi.net/mission.  
37 CEPI, CEPI TO FUND THREE PROGRAMMES TO DEVELOP VACCINES AGAINST THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS, NCOV-
2019 (Jan. 23, 2020), https://cepi.net/news_cepi/cepi-to-fund-three-programmes-to-develop-vaccines-against-the-
novel-coronavirus-ncov-2019/. 
38 See Jon Cohen, Scientists Are Moving at Record Speed to Create New Coronavirus Vaccines—But They May 
Come Too Late, SCIENCE (Jan. 27, 2020) https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/01/scientists-are-moving-record-
speed-create-new-coronavirus-vaccines-they-may-come-too. 
39 Jon F. Merz, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. (2005), at 17 (reporting that, as of 2005, there were only two public-private product development 
partnerships that had been created before the 1990s). 
40 Id., ib. (finding that, as of 2005, half of the existing public-private partnerships in the field were under five years 
old). 
41 Id., at 2.  
42 Id., ib. (defining access partnerships as “entities concerned primarily with expanding access by pulling together 
manufacturers, funding agencies (such as GAVI, USAID) and developing countries to enable the purchase and 
distribution of existing drugs, vaccines, and other medical products”). 
43 Id., ib. 
44 GAVI, GAVI’S MISSION, https://www.gavi.org/about/mission/. 
45 GAVI, GAVI’S PARTNERSHIP MODEL, https://www.gavi.org/about/gavis-partnership-model/. 
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financial support from donors, as well as on increasing co-finance of vaccine acquisitions by 
countries that benefit from Gavi-purchased vaccines. The partnership currently supports 13 
vaccines targeting hepatitis B, rotavirus, polio, human papillomavirus, measles and rubella, among 
other infectious agents.46 
In contrast to access partnerships, product development partnerships are entities that 
operate at the opposite end of the R&D pipeline, sponsoring early to mid-stage R&D on otherwise 
underfunded diseases.47 Such partnerships are widely used in areas where traditional R&D models 
strain to produce new drugs, as recently exemplified by the Cancer Moonshot.48 They can be 
“general-purpose” partnerships, funding the discovery and development of drugs in multiple areas, 
as is the case of the Innovative Medicines Initiative in Europe;49 partnerships that target specific 
areas, like CARB-X, sponsoring R&D on antibacterial products;50 or disease-specific, like the 
TuBerculosis Vaccine Initiative, which has formed a 50-party consortium to discover and develop 
new tuberculosis vaccines.51  
The number of new public-private partnerships launched per year in the biopharmaceutical 
arena has grown exponentially since the turn of the century.52 In 1995, only one partnership entered 
the market.53 In 2000, there were four new partnerships.54 But it is what happened from 2006 
onwards that changed the landscape of multi-party biopharmaceutical R&D. Between 2006 and 
2013, 310 new biopharmaceutical public-private partnerships entered the market, an average of 
nearly 40 per year. In 2012 alone, 63 new partnerships were launched. These numbers speak to the 
buoyancy of large-scale collaborative partnerships as the current preferred model to counter 
imperfect incentives to biopharmaceutical research. 
 
B. The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations 
 
The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) was launched at Davos in 
early 2017 and its sole focus is to fund vaccine R&D on infectious diseases. It is funded primarily 
by the governments of Norway, Japan and Germany, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the 
                                                        
46 GAVI, VACCINE SUPPORT, https://www.gavi.org/support/nvs/.  
47 See Merz, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, supra, note 
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2 (defining product development partnerships as “nonprofit entities that sponsor 
others to perform or directly perform themselves at least one of the following R&D activities: basic research (such 
as target identification, validation and proof of concept), animal, preclinical and clinical testing, licensing, and 
manufacturing”). 
48 NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, CANCER MOONSHOT, https://www.cancer.gov/research/key-initiatives/moonshot-
cancer-initiative. 
49 INNOVATIVE MEDICINES INITIATIVE, ABOUT IMI, https://www.imi.europa.eu/about-imi. 
50 COMBATING ANTIBIOTIC-RESISTANT BACTERIA BIOPHARMACEUTICAL ACCELERATOR (CARB-X), ABOUT CARB-
X, https://carb-x.org/about/overview/. 
51 TUBERCULOSIS VACCINE INITIATIVE, TBVI AT A GLANCE, http://www.tbvi.eu/about-us/tbvi-at-a-glance/. 
52 See Mark D. Lim, Consortium Sandbox: Building and Sharing Resources, 242 SCIENCE TRANSL. MED. 1, 2 
(2014). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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Wellcome Trust,55 and subsidiarily by several other institutions.56 As of January 2020, CEPI has 
over 70 partners, including research institutions, large pharmaceutical companies, regulatory 
agencies and non-profits.57 
Part of the impetus for the formation of a large-scale public-private partnership in this field, 
and one of the reasons it came together so quickly,58 was the inexistence of Ebola vaccines during 
the 2014-15 Ebola crisis.59 Yet, as a whole, the partnership was created with much broader goals 
than merely addressing the problems posed by recent outbreaks.60 The partnership was designed 
to play the role of “gap-filler”61 for lacking R&D on vaccines targeting infectious diseases: 
 
CEPI wants to galvanize the development of new vaccines against 
diseases we know could cause the next devastating epidemic. We 
will achieve our vision by creating an innovative partnership 
between public, private, philanthropic and civil organizations. It is 
ambitious both in its scope and in the breadth of organizations 
involved. CEPI will take an end-to-end approach – we won’t take 
on discovery research or vaccine delivery, but we will work through 
all the steps in between. We will stay abreast of new discoveries and 
technologies, and we’ll work with other organizations to make sure 
any vaccines that are developed reach those who need them.62 
 
CEPI’s initial goals, for projects developed between 2017 and 2021, are for the partnership 
to “tackle barriers” in vaccine R&D and ensure that collaborations between partners will result in 
“affordable vaccines.”63 An additional long-term goal, for work to be done after 2021, is to draw 
on the “capabilities and partnerships” developed during the first stage and extend the business 
model “to cover endemic diseases and other medical interventions.”64 
                                                        
55 The Wellcome Trust is a U.K. non-profit organization, and one of the largest funders of global biomedical R&D. 
See WELLCOME TRUST, ABOUT US, https://wellcome.ac.uk/about-us. 
56 These include the governments of Belgium, Canada and Australia, the European Union and Australia’s Medical 
Research Future Fund. See CEPI, PARTNERS, http://cepi.net/partners.  
57 Id. 
58 Interview with CEPI Senior Consultant (on file with author). 
59 See John-Arne Røttingen et al., New Vaccines Against Epidemic Infectious Diseases, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 610, 
610 (2017); Børge Brende et al., CEPI—A New Global R&D Organisation for Epidemic Preparedness and 
Response, 389 Lancet 233, 233 (2017) (arguing that “[e]valuations of the Ebola response highlight that the global 
community must rethink how vaccines, diagnostics, and drugs for emerging infections are developed given their 
lack of commercial profitability”). 
60 CEPI, SUMMARY, at 5 (noting that “the coalition [CEPI] was created not because of the failure to deliver an Ebola 
vaccine in time for it to be useful, but because of how close that project could have come to success”). 
61 CEPI, CEPI’S END-TO-END GAP-FILLING ROLE: A SUSTAINABLE PARTNERSHIP APPROACH, 
http://cepi.net/sites/default/files/CEPI_Gap_Filling_Role.pdf. 
62 CEPI, APPROACH, http://cepi.net/approach. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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Between 2017 and 2021, CEPI is funding65 R&D on pathogens chosen from the World 
Health Organization’s list of “priority diseases.”66 Unlike Ebola, for which there was ongoing 
R&D before the 2014-15 outbreak, many of these pathogens have “weak R&D pipelines.”67 
CEPI’s initial projection is that the partnership will invest in vaccine projects targeting up to three 
priority pathogens.68 The boost in funding, allied with the combined expertise of a plurality of 
parties involved in each project, is expected to lead to the development of between four and six 
vaccine candidates ready for phase III trials by 2021.69 At this point, CEPI will facilitate 
partnerships with private-sector pharmaceutical companies to ensure “sufficient global vaccine 
development and manufacturing capacity.”70 
The CEPI initial budget for a five-year period was estimated between U.S. 600 million and 
1 billion.71 A year after it was launched, the partnership had reached $625 million in multi-donor 
contributions.72 As CEPI produces the first deliverables, the goal is to move towards 10-year 
funding periods, which will enable the partnership to operate on an expanded timeline, as well as 
to fund larger R&D projects.73 Between March and August 2018, CEPI has awarded three 
contracts funding vaccine R&D on Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS), 
Nipah virus and Lassa fever.74 
CEPI’s awards, both current and future, are guided by a set of core principles aimed at 
guaranteeing the ultimate availability of CEPI-sponsored vaccines.75 Chief among these principles 
is “equitable access,” which translates into affordability and availability of CEPI-funded 
vaccines.76 Other principles include “shared benefits,” which relates to the allocation of potential 
revenue between parties involved in a project.77  
                                                        
65 CEPI, PRELIMINARY BUSINESS PLAN, 2017-2021 (November 2016) (hereinafter PRELIMINARY BUSINESS PLAN) 
(on file with author). 
66 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., AN R&D BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION TO PREVENT EPIDEMICS (2017) (listing nine groups 
of pathogens). The pathogens chosen for CEPI’s first stage were Lassa fever, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome 
Coronavirus (MERS), and Nipah virus. 
67 CEPI, PRELIMINARY BUSINESS PLAN, supra note 65. 
68 Id., at 9. 
69 Id., at 28. 
70 Id., ib. 
71 Id., at 47. 
72 See Catherine Cheney, CEPI, A Year In: How Can We Get Ready for the Next Pandemic?, DEVEX (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.devex.com/news/cepi-a-year-in-how-can-we-get-ready-for-the-next-pandemic-91987. 
73 CEPI, PRELIMINARY BUSINESS PLAN, supra note 65, at 50. 
74 See CEPI, CEPI AWARDS CONTRACT WORTH UP TO USD$36 MILLION TO CONSORTIUM LED BY IDT TO DEVELOP 
MERS VACCINE (Aug. 20, 2018), http://cepi.net/news/cepi-awards-contract-worth-usd36-million-consortium-led-
idt-develop-mers-vaccine; WISTAR INST. PRESS RELEASE, COALITION FOR EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS INNOVATIONS 
SUPPORTS MERS & LASSA ENHANCED DNA VACCINE TECHNOLOGY TO EXPEDITE VACCINE DEVELOPMENT, (Apr. 
19, 2018), https://wistar.org/news/press-releases/coalition-epidemic-preparedness-innovations-supports-mers-lassa-
enhanced-dna; Lisa M. Jarvis, CEPI and Themis Partner for Vaccines, 96 CHEM. & ENGINEERING NEWS 19 (Mar. 
12, 2018) https://cen.acs.org/articles/96/i11/CEPI-Themis-partner-vaccines.html. 
75 Interview with CEPI Senior Consultant, supra note 58. Initially CEPI addressed “shared benefits” and 
“intellectual property management” separately, but already regarding both as a means of ensuring equitable access 
to vaccines; see infra note 78, and accompanying text. 
76 CEPI, PRESENTATION TO THE WHO (Jul. 21, 2017) (on file with author). 
77 CEPI, POLICIES, http://cepi.net/cepi-policies 
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CEPI considers equitable access to be the most important principle governing its awards 
for vaccine R&D.78 Policy documentation circulated in 2017 provided a tentative definition of the 
principle, stating that “[g]lobal access arrangements will be negotiated in contracts between CEPI 
and vaccine developers to ensure affordability and availability in Low and Middle Income 
Countries.”79 Further clarification can be found in CEPI’s Preliminary Business Plan, which breaks 
down the principle into two components. First, in the case of an outbreak, it means “access to 
investigational vaccine stockpiles” for phase III trials and “emergency development.”80 And 
second, if a CEPI-funded vaccine is approved by a national regulatory entity, it means “access to 
the licensed vaccine” in terms that guarantee that the vaccine is affordable and that it is made 
available to populations in need.81 
It should be noted that, although awards have been made, CEPI’s equitable access policy 
is still evolving.82 The initial policy was drafted for a one-year trial, and will be refined after CEPI 
analyzes the comments received during a period of public consultation, which ended in August 
2018.83 
Even though the policy is not finalized, CEPI has established that equitable access is not 
incompatible with proprietary rights over CEPI-funded vaccines, and that position is very unlike 
to change, given the underlying business model of the partnership.84 In fact, CEPI has made it 
explicit that “[c]ontracts should include reasonable royalty payment provisos for products or 
patents.”85 This is part of a broader policy designed both to promote fairness and attract 
commercial partners. The interim CEO of CEPI has referred to this as the idea of “no loss,” in the 
sense that “vaccine developers should be reimbursed for their direct and indirect costs.”86 These 
goals are embodied in CEPI’s second core principle, shared benefits, which has been framed by 
CEPI as a means to promote equitable access.87  
“Shared benefits” operates in cases in which CEPI-funded vaccines generate revenue, a 
prospect that is taken as unlikely: 
 
It is anticipated that vaccines developed with CEPI support will not 
be profitable. In the event that a vaccine developed with CEPI 
support does develop economic value, agreements between CEPI 
and the vaccine developer will ensure either that CEPI’s investment 
is reimbursed or that the economic value is shared through royalties 
or other risk sharing agreements. Any rewards that accrue to vaccine 
                                                        
78 CEPI, CEPI POLICY DOCUMENTATION (2017) (on file with author) (“Equitable access is CEPI’s most important 
principle; the policies on shared risks/shared benefits and management of IP support CEPI’s aim of achieving 
equitable access to CEPI-supported vaccines”), at 2. 
79 Id., at 12. 
80 CEPI, PRELIMINARY BUSINESS PLAN, supra note 65, at 12. 
81 Id., ib. 
82 Interview with CEPI Senior Consultant, supra note 58. 
83 CEPI, INVITATION TO COMMENT ON CEPI’S POLICY REGARDING EQUITABLE ACCESS, 
http://cepi.net/sites/default/files/Access%20Policy--Public%20FINAL_1.pdf. 
84 Interview with CEPI Senior Consultant, supra note 58 (noting that CEPI is “IP-neutral). 
85 CEPI, PRESENTATION TO THE WHO, supra note 65. 
86 Id. 
87 See supra note 78, and accompanying text. 
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developers should be proportionate to the level of risk undertaken 
and to the nature of the R&D, infrastructure, IP or other 
contributions a developer has made.88 
 
If commercial benefits arise, both CEPI and the awardee(s) are entitled to recoup costs 
proportionally to their investment in the project.89 CEPI’s ability to recoup costs is limited to 
licensed vaccines or other foreground90 intellectual property, with an obligation to return all 
commercial benefits to CEPI’s funding pool.91 
The general rule is that both background and foreground intellectual property belong to the 
recipient of a CEPI grant.92 In order to build a degree of flexibility into the negotiation process,93 
specific intellectual property terms are dealt with on a case-by-case basis.94 This takes into account 
the different capabilities and internal policies of diverse R&D partners. It also enables expedited 
transfers of technology during situations of public health crisis.95 
Background or foreground intellectual property used in a CEPI-funded project may be 
made available to third parties to “foster broader research efforts and innovation of vaccines for 
emerging infectious diseases that lack market potential.”96 In such cases, the license regulating the 
transfer of intellectual property must be a “non-exclusive, royalty-free, sub-licensable and 
worldwide license.”97 
Keeping in line with CEPI’s goal of promoting vaccine innovation, CEPI awardees are 
required to comply with other knowledge-disseminating obligations.98 The requirements include 
sharing clinical trial data and results through a publicly available platform; timely publication of 
results; and publication of negative results.99 
CEPI also enforces an open access publication model.100 Any publication resulting from 
CEPI funding must be made available for free, immediately and providing “unrestricted access 
free of charge, with maximum opportunities for re-use, and including the underlying data.”101 
 
 
                                                        
88 CEPI, PRELIMINARY BUSINESS PLAN, supra note 65, at 12. 
89 CEPI POLICY DOCUMENTATION, supra note 58, at 8. 
90 Foreground intellectual property refers to new rights arising out of a collaborative R&D project, as opposed to 
background intellectual property, which refers to the pre-existing rights covering technology that a party brings to a 
collaborative R&D project. 
91 CEPI POLICY DOCUMENTATION, supra note 78, at 8. 
92 Id., at 13 (noting that “CEPI’s preferred approach is not to take ownership of IP”). 
93 Interview with CEPI Senior Consultant, supra note 58. 
94 CEPI POLICY DOCUMENTATION, supra note 78, at 10. 
95 Interview with CEPI Senior Consultant, supra note 58. 
96 CEPI POLICY DOCUMENTATION, supra note 78, at 10. 
97 Id., ib. 
98 Id., at 6. 
99 Id., ib. 
100 Id., ib. 
101 Id., ib. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
As vaccine-preventable pathogens spread faster in an increasingly globalized world, the 
development of new vaccines remains a critical public health priority. This Essay has highlighted 
the disconnect between IP regimes heavily centered on incentives narratives and the challenges 
posed by markets for vaccines targeting infectious diseases. The emergence of new public-private 
partnerships focusing on vaccine technology constitutes a much-needed addition to an otherwise 
severely underfunded R&D landscape. In examining the role and operating principles of CEPI, the 
Essay has illustrated how IP rights associated with the development of new vaccines can be 
managed within collaborative R&D models.  
 
 
 
